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GOVERNING IN A RIGHTS
CULTURE
Mary Dawson, Q.C.

*

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will address the impact on governments1 of the
entrenchment of rights in our Constitution and will also touch upon
some of the claims that are made as to their broader impact on society as
a whole. The positive observations are explored as well as some of the
concerns. An attempt is made to assess critically some of the concerns
that have been expressed within government circles.
The extent to which these criticisms and claims reflect reality,
however, is beyond the scope of the paper. That assessment should be
made, at least in relation to policy decisions taken by government, but
that will require focused discussions in specific cases with those who
are directly involved in those policy decisions.
This paper, hopefully, is a first step in that direction. It will draw no
specific conclusions and will make no recommendations. Rather it will
focus on identifying concerns so that we can address them head on.
Once we have identified them, and agreed that these are our concerns,
we will be able to deal with them. We can lay aside those that are myths
and move beyond those we can do nothing about. We should then be in
a position to deal with the rest.

________________________________________________________________
*
Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Justice, Ottawa. This
paper is reproduced with permission of the CBA from conference
materials published in The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
Twenty Years Later in 2001. The views expressed in the paper should
not be taken as necessarily reflecting the position of the Government of
Canada
on any matter.
1
Often in this paper, when governments are referred to, the
reference is to government in the broad sense, including the legislatures.
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II. BACKGROUND
The patriation of Canada’s Constitution, on April 17, 1982, was in
itself a watershed event, completing at last the final legal step in
Canada’s slow march to independent nationhood. Canada now had its
own amending formula. But that was not all that Canada acquired on
that rainy spring day. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2
was given pride of place as Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982.3
Immediately following the Charter is Part II, Rights of the Aboriginal
Peoples of Canada, with its recognition and affirmation of the
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. These
first two parts of our patriation package have had a profound impact on
Canadian society.
The Charter is a reflection of the classical liberal vision championed by
Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, with its spotlight on the importance
of the individual and individual rights.4 The Charter was also conceived
as a unifying force for Canadians, establishing a common set of
constitutionally protected rights that apply to each and every Canadian.
Much debate took place as the Charter was constructed, concerning both
its detail and the desirability of entrenching a Charter at all. Once the
Charter became part of our Constitution, however, much of the
nervousness and concern melted away, at least amongst the general
public. Perhaps one of the most remarkable observations about the
Charter is the extent to which it has become a symbol of pride and a
source of identification for Canadians, thus becoming a unifying force
as had been hoped.
Aboriginal and treaty rights, unlike most of the rights in the Charter,
are collective, group rights that belong not to individual Aboriginal
persons but to the Aboriginal group to which they belong.5 Section 35 of
________________________________________________________________
2

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.),
1982, c. 11 (hereinafter “the Charter”).
3
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
4
It is interesting to note, though, that some of the rights protected
by the Charter relating to linguistic issues have, to a greater or lesser
extent, a group aspect to them. See sections 16 to 23 (official
languages), section 16.1 (linguistic communities in New Brunswick),
and section 23 (minority language educational rights). Consider, as well,
the underlying protection for minority groups that is afforded by section
15. 5
This is not to say that Aboriginal or treaty rights are not often
invoked at the individual level. See, for example, R. v. Sparrow, [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1075.
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the Constitution Act, 1982,6 recognizes the separate status of particular
groups on the basis of their historical circumstances. Charter rights pertain
to our status as individuals and are concerned with the relationship between
the state and the individual. Thus the basis for these two types of rights is
quite different. Aboriginal peoples can claim their rights against
governments or against other Canadian citizens. The Charter, on the other
hand, is directed against governments alone. Charter rights and section 35
rights are not at all comparable, but are treated together in this paper
because both types of rights form part of the “rights culture” in which
we now find ourselves.
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is clothed in simple terms.
Subsection 35(1), the core of the section, could almost be taken as a
tautological statement: “The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”
Despite its apparent simplicity, the courts have given it great force. The
last two decades have seen enormous strides in the identification and
acceptance of Aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada.
As exciting and popular as the entrenchment of Parts I and II in the
Constitution Act, 1982 have been, there are those who claim that the
entrenchment was not a good idea, or at best that it was a mixed
blessing.
The Charter has had an enormous impact on governments. Some
Charter critics would claim that far too much power has been shifted
from the legislatures and governments to the courts. Others, while not
necessarily critics of the Charter itself, have expressed broader concerns
relating to power and control. They point to the added impediments to
governmental action and decision-making that come with the need to
take those new rights into account. Some worry that the legislatures and
governments are actually being prevented from achieving important
________________________________________________________________
6

Section 35 reads as follows:
35.(1) The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed.
(2) In this Act, “Aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes
the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty in subsection (1) “treaty rights”
includes rights that now exist by way of land claims
agreements or may be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the
Aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are
guaranteed equally to male and female persons.

Job Name: SCLR14

Time:23:04

1st proofs

Date:Friday, February 10, 2012

254

Supreme Court Law Review

(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)

goals or are being diverted by rights activists from social and economic
reforms that are more important than the issues of the day brought by
pressure groups. More generally, some claim that the rights culture is
having an effect that goes to the root of our social structure and is
damaging the very cohesion of our society.
Canada was not alone in entrenching rights in its Constitution. Our
closest neighbour, the United States of America, has had its Bill of
Rights for more than two centuries.7 The United Nations’ Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, a major influence on Canada’s Charter,
was adopted and proclaimed on December 10, 1948, following closely
on the end of the Second World War.8 In the years that followed, the
United Nations expanded the scope of its human rights protections in a
number of instruments.9 Under the auspices of the Council of Europe,
formed in 1949 for the protection of human rights, pluralist democracy
and the rule of law, The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms10 was adopted on November
4, 1950 and came into force on September 3, 1953. In turn, individual
states are establishing their own special laws.
Within Canada, itself, the move towards the Charter was a gradual
one. In 1960, the Canadian Bill of Rights11 was enacted by Parliament,
but it was a simple statute and, with few exceptions,12 was not given
pre-eminent force. During the period leading up to the entrenchment of
the Charter, human rights codes were developing in Canada at both the
federal and provincial levels.13
________________________________________________________________
7

The American Bill of Rights came into force on December 15,

1791.
8

G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
Among the most important are the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and the International
Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.
10
The protection of these rights was reaffirmed very recently with
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was
signed
and proclaimed on December 7, 2000.
11
S.C. 1960, c. 44; R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
12
For one of the few instances where the Bill of Rights was given
teeth,
see R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282.
13
Saskatchewan’s legislation was the first, in 1947 (Saskatchewan
Bill of Rights, 1947, S.S. 1947, c. 35). The Canadian Human Rights Act
was enacted in 1978 (S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, now R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6). For
further details, see Tarnopolsky, Discrimination and the Law, 2nd ed.,
revised by Pentney (Don Mills, Ontario: De Boo, 1985), Chapters 1 and
2.
9
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Canada was one of the first, if not the first, country with a strong
tradition of parliamentary supremacy to entrench rights in its
Constitution. This was an easier leap for Canada than for Great Britain,
for instance, because Canada already had a written constitution. A
written constitution for Canada was made necessary by the fact that it
was a federation with a division of legislative powers that had to be
established in detail by statute. Canadian governments have become used
to having their legislation scrutinized by the courts to ensure that they are
not overstepping their legislative authorities. However, the entrenchment
of individual and group rights in our Constitution has brought a whole
new dimension to the relationship between the legislatures and the
courts. Constitutionally protected rights bring us into the domain of
values and public policy far more deeply and starkly than do the more
technical legal issues relating to the division of powers.
Rights are not new to the legal system. Private law, regulating the
relationship between individual citizens, has always been a matter of
weighing the rights of one claimant against another, a matter of winners
and losers. This is the proper domain of the courts, not of governments.
Furthermore, from time to time, in private law cases the courts have
been seen to take sudden leaps, to break from precedents, and, in effect,
to create or invent new law. One need only look at one of the first torts
cases studied in law school, Donoghue v. Stevenson,14 for an example of
this judicial creativity. Donaghue was a 1932 case in Scotland about a
snail in a ginger beer bottle. In that case, the Privy Council (Lord Atkin)
for the first time in a Commonwealth court extended the causal link in a
negligence suit to find that a manufacturer owed a duty of care, not only
to direct purchasers, but to potential clients further down the chain of
connection.
There are also examples of such leaps in cases where a government is
a party. Again turning to jurisprudence cited in first year law school, we
find a constitutional law case, Edwards v. Attorney-General for
Canada,15 perhaps better known in recent years as the “persons case.”
That was the case where women sought the right to be eligible to sit in
the Senate, to be considered “qualified persons” under section 24 of the
then British North America Act, 1867.16 In that case, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council overturned a long line of cases from
several different countries that confirmed the ineligibility of women to
________________________________________________________________
14
15
16

[1932] A.C. 562.
[1930] A.C. 124.
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
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take public office. Not only did it break from a clear line of
jurisprudence in the common law world, but it also created a new way to
interpret Canada’s Constitution. It was strongly argued by governments
that the British North America Act had to be interpreted and understood
as it would have been in 1867, when written. Lord Sankey, in the Privy
Council, found differently, stating that the Constitution “planted in
Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits.”17 He established the “living tree doctrine” which has had an
important effect on the interpretation of our Constitution, allowing it to
grow and develop in order to fit current circumstances.
Even within this context, the constitutional changes made in 1982 were
profound. The courts have taken up their expanded domains with
enthusiasm and vigour.18 The changes have themselves unleashed a
dynamic of their own and have changed the way Canadians understand
themselves as individuals. Global events take us, and much of the rest of the
world, in the same direction. In recent years many countries, and many
international groupings of countries, have developed standards of human
rights, as we have done in Canada. We have entered a rights age, a rights
culture. This culture reinforces itself, and the pursuit of one’s rights,
whether as between citizens and their governments or more broadly as
among private citizens, becomes accepted and, some would argue,
expected.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING MECHANISMS
The search for balance and compromise, so much a Canadian trait (or
at least one to which we aspire), is reflected in the Charter and in the
way that our courts deal with the protection of Aboriginal and treaty
rights under section 35.
Both sections 1 and 33, forming figurative and literal brackets around
the rest of the Charter, offer some relief from the potential rigour of its
guarantees.
Canada, so far as we know, was the first country to include in its
fundamental law on rights a provision contemplating the limitation of
________________________________________________________________
17
18

Supra, note 15, at 136.
Without the Charter and section 35, one could surmise that the
courts might have gradually moved in the same general direction as that in
which these constitutionally entrenched rights have taken us, but not with
the same specificity or within the same time frame.
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those rights.19 Section 120 sets out the general guarantee of the rights and
freedoms in the Charter, and then allows for the rights and freedoms to
be superseded by public interest considerations if their limitation can be
“demonstrably justified.” This provision, notably placed at the
beginning of the Charter, carries with it the message that rights and
freedoms cannot be seen as absolutes. Rights and freedoms can be
limited by law so long as the limits are justified in accordance with
section 1.
There are several sections of the Charter that carry within themselves
balancing mechanisms that limit the scope of rights even before resort is
to be made to section 1. For example, section 8 refers to “unreasonable
search and seizure” (emphasis added) and section 9 refers to “the right
not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned” (emphasis added). In those
cases, most of the balancing takes place with the rights section itself.
Other sections, like sections 721 and 1522 of the Charter, include
concepts that are particularly susceptible to value judgments. Section 7
refers to “principles of fundamental justice,” while section 15 addresses
equality rights. Courts have exercised a good portion of their balancing
within these sections, rather than waiting for a section 1 analysis. One
________________________________________________________________

19
Other countries are showing interest in this approach. South
Africa’s Constitution has followed the Canadian precedent and Israel
has considered
doing so as well.
20
Section 1 of the Charter reads as follows:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
21
Section 7 reads as follows:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
22
Section 15 reads as follows:
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of
the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
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significant effect of this shift, at least in principle, is on the burden of
proof. The burden of proof lies on government under section 1, but on
the rights claimant under the rights and freedoms sections of the
Charter.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have evidenced a tendency to import
into sections 7 and 15 almost all of the balancing that can take place in
relation to them. This trend is being called the “contextual approach.”
Much has been written recently on the move away from section 1.23 This
subject is a large one and well beyond the scope of this paper.
Section 3324 is another unique Canadian provision. It allows for a
five-year suspension of certain of the Charter protections if Parliament
or a legislature finds it appropriate to invoke the section. The Quebec
National Assembly established a blanket application of section 33 for
unique political reasons25 soon after the patriation of the Constitution in

________________________________________________________________
23

See, for a good overview of recent trends under section 15,
Hogg’s discussion of discrimination: Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada, looseleaf, 4th ed., vol. 2, (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) (updated
1999,
release 1), section 52.7(b).
24
Section 33 reads as follows:
33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may
expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the
legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included
in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a
declaration made under this section is in effect shall have
such operation as it would have but for the provision of this
Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease
to have effect five years after it comes into force or on such
earlier date as may be specified in the declaration.
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may reenact a declaration made under subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made
under
subsection (4).
25
Soon after the Charter was adopted, the Quebec National
Assembly passed an omnibus law, An Act respecting the Constitution
Act, 1982, S.Q. 1982, c. 21, invoking the section 33 override in relation
to all Quebec laws as well as adopting the override routinely in each
new Act. This practice lapsed as a routine matter when a Liberal
government was elected in Quebec at the end of 1985.
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1982 but, with that exception, section 33 has not often been used.26 This
is perhaps as it should be since section 33 is a blunt instrument and
carries with it no justificatory text or other balancing mechanism. On the
other hand, it does have a five-year limit. There are those who argue that
section 33 has been underutilized.27 The Supreme Court itself has given
it a tentative legitimacy, contemplating the possibility of “even
overarching laws under section 33 of the Charter.”28 Whether desirable
or not, section 33 does provide elected representatives with a way to
escape the framework of the Charter in exceptional circumstances.
In a parallel way, the jurisprudence on section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, relating to Aboriginal and treaty rights, has recognized that these
rights must be understood and made operational in the context of a
diverse society that is integrated with the Aboriginal peoples who hold
those rights. Accordingly, the courts recognize that governments still
have the power to regulate the exercise of Aboriginal rights if those
governments are pursuing a valid legislative objective, but they must

________________________________________________________________
26

Saskatchewan invoked section 33 in the S.G.E.U. Dispute
Settlement Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. 111 (back to work legislation) for
fear that it offended paragraph 2(d) of the Charter (freedom of
association). The use of the override was later proven unnecessary by
the Supreme Court of Canada in R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 460, where the majority held that the right to strike was not
protected by paragraph 2(b). In addition to the early general application
of the override in Quebec, the Quebec National Assembly invoked
section 33 several times, even after the Liberal government was elected
in 1985. Its use became very controversial in one instance: in relation to
the French-only sign law in An Act to amend the Charter of the French
Language, S.Q. 1983, c. 56. That declaration expired after five years
and was not renewed. Alberta used the override very recently in the
Marriage Amendment Act (S.A. 2000, c. 3, amending The Marriage Act,
R.S.A. 1980, c. M-6), which came into force on March 23, 2000 (to
prevent marriage between same-sex couples). The Government of
Alberta also considered using it recently in legislation aimed at capping
liability relating to involuntary sterilizations, but withdrew that initiative
in light of public reaction. The Parliament of Canada has never invoked
section
33.
27
See, for example, Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter:
Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (Don Mills,
Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 38, and Hogg, Constitutional
Law28of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at 914-17.
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at 566, per Iacobucci
and Cory JJ. (emphasis added).
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still honour their responsibilities towards the Aboriginal peoples before
any other user group.29
The Supreme Court consistently stresses the need to negotiate a
solution when the interests of others clash with the rights and interests
of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.30 The Court recognizes that the
parties themselves can come up with much better solutions than the
Court can if those parties will negotiate in good faith to find those
solutions. Such matters belong, to a great extent, in the political realm
where it is much easier to avoid a win-lose solution that may not lend
itself to long-term accommodation.
IV. THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Charter Rights
The Charter has created a new relationship between federal, provincial
and territorial governments in Canada and their citizens.31 It has established
a direct right for any Canadian to take governments in Canada to court in
relation to the infringement of any of the rights guaranteed by the
Charter, whether by actions of a government or by statute. Governments
in Canada have always been answerable for failure to adhere to general
principles of natural justice or for failure to meet human rights standards
they have set in their own legislation, but the Charter has opened up a
multitude of new grounds of complaint. Section 15, the equality section,
is particularly fruitful in this regard. It makes governmental programs
and social policy decisions vulnerable to reassessment by the courts on
grounds of discrimination. The remedies for a successful challenge
have, on occasion, resulted in adjustments to government programs that
have expanded them beyond their original scope and have sometimes
resulted in significant additional expenditures. When large sums of
money are at stake, alarm bells go off amongst politicians, public
servants, and the general public alike.

________________________________________________________________
29

See R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; and R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3
S.C.R.
456 (hereinafter cited as R. v. Marshall (No. 1)).
30
See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 29, at 1123,
and 31
R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at 817-18.
In fact, many of the provisions of the Charter actually extend
beyond Canadian citizens to include all individuals in Canada.
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An important early Charter decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
was the Singh32 case in 1985. It had wide policy and financial
implications. One of the primary purposes of the Charter was to protect
the weak from the strong, the individual from the power of the state.
The Singh case addressed itself to one of the most vulnerable groups in
society. It related to procedural protection for refugee claimants. The
Supreme Court found that all individuals present in Canada, not only
citizens or residents, will benefit from the protection of section 7 of the
Charter on the bases of the principles of fundamental justice referred to
in that section. It went on to find that oral hearings were necessary in
certain circumstances to determine the credibility of refugee claimants.
This resulted in fundamental changes to our refugee determination
scheme that involved costs in the billions of dollars. It also resulted in
changes in procedures of many other decision-making bodies.
The Schachter case,33 like the Singh case,34 had an important impact
on public money. That case, based on section 15, started on its way
through the courts in 198635 and came to its ultimate resolution in the
Supreme Court of Canada in 1992. Mr. Schachter was a natural father
complaining that his rights had been violated because adoptive fathers
had access to benefits that were not available to natural fathers. The
Federal Court-Trial Division extended the benefits to natural parents
and this was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal.36 The Supreme
Court modified the decision, limiting the cases where, and setting rules
for determining when, the courts can actually adjust legislation, thereby
changing the result in the Schachter case. However, by that time a
relatively small program ($5 million) had been converted to one costing
hundreds of millions. Furthermore, the original trial level decision led to
an entirely new parental benefits scheme that adjusted the way benefits
were paid to all parents, and resulted in a new theory of maternity and
parental leave.
On the other hand, in the recent Lovelace case,37 the Supreme Court
declined to extend to non-status Indians and Métis communities rights
________________________________________________________________
32

Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985]
1 S.C.R.
177.
33
Schachter
v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
34
Supra, note 32.
35
Schacter v. Canada, [1988] 3 F.C. 515 (C.A.).
36
Schacter v. Canada, [1990] 2 F.C. 129 (T.D.).
37
Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950. In that case, the Court
found that the casino project was specifically targeted at improving the
circumstances of a status Indian community in a way that corresponded
to their actual needs and circumstances and that the exclusion of the
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assigned to members of bands registered under the Indian Act. That case
involved the distribution of funds generated by a casino on an Indian
reserve.
Some Charter cases, often in the area of criminal law, can result in
costs that are not measurable in monetary terms but can have a
significant societal impact. The Askov decision38 is, perhaps, the best
known example of such a case. There, the Supreme Court found that
criminal cases were simply taking too long in the courts and rendered a
decision that resulted in large numbers of cases being dropped. That
decision resulted, as well, in significant new provincial expenditures for
the administration of justice, particularly in Ontario. In the Stinchcombe
case,39 additional burdens were put on the Crown relating to disclosure
of evidence to the accused. Such a decision has significant costs to
society, some of them hidden. While full disclosure carries with it the
possibility of shorter trials and reduces the chance of injustice towards
the accused, the Stinchcombe case resulted in the need for additional
resources to comply with the new requirements and generated a
significant volume of litigation to determine how far disclosure should
go, particularly when the information relates to third parties.
At the same time, courts are by no means oblivious to cost
considerations. In the Schachter case40 the Supreme Court found that,
while cost implications cannot be used to justify a particular decision,
they can be considered in determining the appropriate remedy. Two
years later, in the Prosper case,41 the Supreme Court declined to impose
certain obligations on government to make legal aid available, observing
that such a finding would result in serious cost implications for the
provinces. In that case the Court found that:
… it would be a very big step for this Court to interpret the Charter
in a manner which imposes a positive constitutional obligation on
governments. The fact that such an obligation would almost certainly
interfere with governments’ allocation of limited resources by
requiring them to expend public funds on the provision of a service is, I
might add, a further consideration which weighs against this
interpretation.42 (Emphasis in original)
other groups did not undermine the purpose of the program since it was
not based
on a misconception of the needs of the other groups.
38
R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199.
39
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
40
Supra, note 33, at 709.
41
R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236.
42
Id., at 267.
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Sometimes court decisions have minimal cost implications, but may
in effect cut off policy options for governments. The Burns and Rafay
case43 contained strong language that one could argue might even cut off
the possibility of Canada reintroducing the death penalty, should
Parliament some day determine that it would be appropriate to do so.44
Yet, in another controversial area, the Supreme Court struck down the
abortion provisions of the Criminal Code45 in the Morgentaler case,46
but left room for Parliament to re-enact its legislation on abortion while
at the same time meeting the requirements of the Charter, as established
by the Court. The Government of Canada attempted new legislation
following the decision but, when it met some resistance in the Senate,
chose to let the situation stand. It has not taken up the subject of
abortion again, leaving the field unregulated.
2. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights
As for Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982, relating to Aboriginal and
treaty rights, section 35 raised to the constitutional level the status of the
Aboriginal and treaty rights that were in existence on April 17, 1982.
Unlike the Charter, section 35 does not address itself directly to
governments and legislatures. Nor does it direct itself to remedies in
case of a breach of the rights it recognizes. Nor does it include express
balancing mechanisms such as those described in the previous section of
this paper. Because section 35 is a recognition and affirmation of rights,
it follows that these rights can be raised in any context and can be
argued in disputes against private litigants as well as against
governments.
In the decade before section 35 came into force, the courts were
increasingly defining and relying on Aboriginal rights in their decisions
and establishing the extent of government responsibilities towards the
________________________________________________________________
43
44

United States of America v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283.
Id., at para. 77, the Court found that “while government policy
at any particular moment may or may not be consistent with principles
of fundamental justice, the fact that successive governments and
Parliaments over a period of almost 40 years have refused to inflict the
death penalty reflects, we believe, a fundamental Canadian principle
about
the appropriate limits of the criminal justice system.”
45
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 251.
46
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
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Aboriginal peoples of Canada.47 No one was quite sure, when section 35
was enacted, just what effect entrenchment would have on these rights.
There have been many important Aboriginal cases in the years
following the enactment of section 35 that have ensured that the rights
affirmed in that section have been given full force. Twenty years later
we find that litigation on Aboriginal and treaty rights has grown
exponentially.
The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of section 35 for the first
time in the Sparrow case,48 a 1990 decision. It confirmed that the
“existing” rights were those that were not extinguished prior to 1982. It
also found that those rights were not absolute but that any laws that
infringed them would have to meet a high standard of justification (not
at all dissimilar to the “reasonable limits” test we find in section 1 of the
Charter). Finally, and of great significance to governments, the Supreme
Court found in the Sparrow decision that the Government of Canada49
had a “fiduciary” relationship with the Aboriginal peoples of Canada at
the constitutional level.50 This means that the government must keep the
best interests of the Aboriginal peoples at heart when dealing with their
interests. In the words of the Court, “the special trust relationship and
the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis Aboriginals must be the
first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in
question can be justified.”51
________________________________________________________________
47

See Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), [1973]
S.C.R. 313, recognizing that the Nishga people of British Columbia
possessed Aboriginal rights to their lands that had survived European
settlement; Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development), [1980] 1 F.C. 518 (T.D.), relating to
mining laws impairing Aboriginal rights in the Baker Lake Area,
particularly the right to hunt caribou.; Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335,
described
infra, note 50.
48
R.
v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
49
This would apply as well to other governments. See, for
example, R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, at 185-87 and Delgamuukw v.
British
Columbia, supra, note 29, at 1107.
50
Another important decision that dealt with a fiduciary
relationship of the Government of Canada was Guerin v. R., supra, note
47. That case dealt with Indian properties and the Government’s role in
dealing with these properties as a fiduciary. This is a more usual use of
the trust or fiduciary concept. It likely served as an inspiration to the
Supreme
Court in developing the concept in relation to section 35.
51
R. v. Sparrow, supra, note 48, at 1114, per Lamer C.J.C. and La
Forest J. on behalf of a unanimous court.
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The finding of this special relationship between the Government of
Canada and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada confirms a unique link
between the Government and Aboriginal peoples that was not evident
from section 35. It puts a particular overlay on how the government is to
address Aboriginal issues. Hence, there is a special responsibility on
governments that goes beyond the relationship that governments would
have with other groups as well as beyond the relationship that a private
individual would have with Aboriginal peoples. While there is no direct
application provision linking the rights to governments, as there is in
subsection 32(1) of the Charter,52 Aboriginal and treaty rights remain a
particular responsibility of governments that differs from, and augments,
in relation to Aboriginal peoples, the relationship that governments have
more generally with all Canadian citizens.
A recent case of great significance to the Government of Canada is
the Marshall case,53 dealing with treaty rights of the Micmac Indians to
fish on the east coast of Canada. In that case the Supreme Court gave a
broad, and many would say unexpected, interpretation to a treaty
entered into in 1760-61 and found that the Aboriginal peoples involved
must be allowed access to a moderate livelihood from fishing in that
area.54 It also found that the constitutional rights of those Aboriginal
peoples must be balanced against the non-constitutionalized rights of
others engaged in the fishery, citing a previous decision where it stated
“it has frequently been said that rights do not exist in a vacuum, and that
the rights of one individual or group are necessarily limited by the rights
of another.”55 The Government of Canada is currently involved in
negotiations to give practical effect to the Marshall decisions and, in
doing so, must find a way to balance the rights and interests of the
________________________________________________________________
52

Subsection 32(1) reads as follows:
32. (1) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect
of all matters within the authority of Parliament
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and
Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in
respect of all matters within the authority of the
legislature of each province.
53
R.
v.
Marshall
No. 1, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456.
54
Id.,
at
470.
55
R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 (hereinafter cited as R. v.
Marshall No. 2, at 552-53, referring to R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013,
at paras. 91-92.
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Aboriginal peoples and the interests of the non-native fishers who also
depend on that fishery for their livelihood.
V. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
There is no doubt that the entrenchment of the Charter and of
Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution of Canada in 1982 has
limited the power of the legislatures and governments and has increased
the power of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, since
the courts are called upon to determine the scope of those rights.
Governments must make sure that their actions and their laws respect
the constitutionally-entrenched rights and the courts must, when those
actions or laws are challenged, determine whether governments have
succeeded in respecting the rights. Power has flowed from the elected
representatives to an appointed judiciary. These are clear facts.
What is not so clear is whether this has been a good thing.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court is in high repute. It scores high in
public opinion polls and enjoys an excellent international reputation. A
Supreme Court decision on rights generally paves the way for
Parliament or the other legislature involved to proceed with legislative
or policy initiatives that respond to that decision with much less
opposition than it would have had in the absence of such a decision.
Politicians consistently score low on popularity polls, with lawyers
among the few who would score lower. Generally, Canadians appear
quite comfortable having the courts, certainly the Supreme Court, rule
on the legality of governmental actions. Judges are seen as more
dispassionate and fairer than politicians and as more inclined to support
minority rights. Much of the academic literature on the subject would
suggest the same comfort level with the courts.56 Furthermore, some
argue that the perceived legitimacy of the Supreme Court has been
enhanced by the very fact that rights have been entrenched.57
Despite the relatively high comfort level with the courts, there
certainly are criticisms of the judicial role in rights determination. Some
________________________________________________________________

See Devlin, “The Charter and the Anglophone Legal Theory”
(1997), 4(1) Review of Constitutional Studies, at 36-37, for a summary
of opinion
on both sides of this discussion.
57
Ignatieff, Challenges for the Future (Supreme Court of Canada
125th Anniversary Conference, Ottawa, September 2000), at 1-2;
Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of
Liberal Constitutionalism (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press,
2001), at 27-28.
56
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argue that it is undemocratic to allow an unelected institution to make
what are fundamentally policy decisions. Allan Hutchinson rather
caustically remarks in a recent work:
My proposal to abandon rights-talk and give democratic dialogue a
real chance will only ring hollow and naïve to those latter-day
aristocrats who crave the privilege to decide what is best for
others.”58
There is likely a significant correlation between those who criticize the
judicial role and those who oppose the Charter itself or are, at best, lukewarm to it.
In a related vein, some argue that courts should not be making these
decisions because judges constitute a remote group who do not reflect,
represent or even understand the general public. Joel Bakan examines
what he calls the “trust” arguments for relying on judges and concludes
that there is no basis to defer to their value judgments because judges
have their own biases from which they cannot escape.59 He claims that
judges are fundamentally a conservative group, chosen from among an
elite stratum of society, and that they take their approaches from what
he calls “dominant ideologies.”60 He agrees with a number of other
critics that the courts favour big business interests, which they see as
meritorious because they contribute to the wealth of society. Even
letting corporations in under the shelter of some of the Charter
protections is cited as evidence of this bias.61 Many, including Bakan
and Hutchinson, point to the lack of success that unions have had in
pressing some of their claims before the courts as evidence of this same
tendency.62
Section 15 of the Charter is particularly laden with value judgments.
Questions can be raised about some of the section 15 decisions that extend
________________________________________________________________
58

Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights
(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995), at xiii.
59
Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs
(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1997), Chapter 2.
60
Id., Chapter 7.
61
See, as well, Hutchinson, supra, note 58, at 32-34 and 150-51.
62
Examples of these cases are: R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin
Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; the “Labour Trilogy”: Reference re
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313;
P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
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benefits to groups not covered by the legislation that establishes the benefits
scheme. The Supreme Court has stated that:
Since Andrews, it has been recognized in the jurisprudence of this
Court that an important, though not exclusive, purpose of s. 15(1) is
the protection of individuals and groups who are vulnerable,
disadvantaged, or members of “discrete and insular minorities”. The
effects of a law as they relate to this purpose should always be a
central consideration in the contextual s. 15(1) analysis.63 (Emphasis
added.)
Of particular interest in the Court’s statement is that the element of
disadvantage is not essential to the application of section 15. A number
of section 15 decisions, in fact, do result in extending coverage to
groups that would not usually be considered to be disadvantaged. One
example is the Schachter case,64 referred to earlier, where
unemployment insurance benefits relating to childcare were extended to
natural fathers. This is evidently an area where the thinking of the Court
has evolved since the earlier cases and appears to be continuing to
evolve.
Of significance in this connection is a very recent speech to a legal
audience by the Chief Justice of Canada. In that speech,65 she recognized
that “Supreme Court of Canada decisions repeatedly assert that reversing
the harmful effects of stereotypical discrimination is the central purpose
of section 15.”66 However, she went on to say:
… rectifying the situation of disadvantaged groups is arguably not
the only type of equality that falls within section 15 of the Charter.
The Charter positively accords Canadians equal benefit of the law
and equal protection from the law’s burden. This can be argued to
extend the guarantee of equality to matters beyond the scope of
traditional anti-discrimination law, to the equal provision of state
benefits, even where the group excluded is not the object of historic
discrimination. The primary concern in such cases is not whether
________________________________________________________________
63

Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at 537, citing Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
64
Schachter
v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
65
Chief Justice McLachlin, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right”
(2000 Constitutional Cases, Professional Development Program,
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 6 April 2001) (published in
this 66
law review).
See McLachlin, id., at p. 25 of this book.
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the group to which the plaintiff belongs has suffered historical
disadvantage requiring a legal remedy, but whether the State’s
largesse has been appropriately distributed.67
The Chief Justice then concluded her assessment of the issue by posing
the very questions that governments continue to grapple with:
Where the goal is equal distribution of benefits, the rules seem less
clear than where the goal is amelioration of the downtrodden class’s
situation. Must the claimant be a member of a disadvantaged group?
Could the government, for example, cut all men out of a welfare
scheme on the ground they are not disadvantaged, leaving section
15(2) aside for the moment? What serves as a sufficient or
substantial distinction between one disadvantaged group and
another? Where, within groups, can the legislature permissibly draw
cut-off lines? What about the argument that it is for the legislature
to decide how to allocate limited resources? Canadian courts have
wrestled with these issues in Schachter and, again, in Law. In Law,
the Court upheld Parliament’s power to cut off benefits on the basis
of age, reasoning that the distinction did not deny the complainant’s
human dignity. However, issues remain, and the Canadian attempt
to fit benefit schemes into section 15 doctrine will continue to
develop.68
None of this leaves governments with a great deal of guidance. It can
afford some comfort, however, in the fact that both the courts and
governments are asking the same kinds of questions.
Intuitively, one might assume that the charge that courts are elitist
might add some weight to the argument that too much power has flowed
from Parliament to the courts. The problem with this, however, is that
many see Parliament as being controlled by elites as well. Much has
been heard in recent years about the dissatisfaction of back-benchers as
to their level of input into public policy decisions. Their frustration is
understandable. But it is not only elected members of Parliament or of
other legislative assemblies who are seeking greater input into decisions.
The public at large would also like to be heard. These are ongoing issues
that continue to require attention.
Perhaps the most potent argument against the legitimacy of the courts
determining rights in the social policy context is that they are simply not
equipped to make decisions on social policy issues. Judges are trained in the
________________________________________________________________
67
68

Id., at pp. 25-26 of this book.
Id., at p. 26 of this book (footnotes omitted).
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law, not in social policy, and do not have access to the tools necessary to
balance competing social interests.69 Furthermore, the adversarial nature of
the litigation process does not lend itself to the trade-offs and compromises
that make the political process workable.
The Supreme Court itself has recognized the strength of this argument
and has expressed, on a number of occasions, the need to defer to the
legislatures when policy choices that do not go to fundamental values
must be made. In the Libman case, the Court stated:
This Court has already pointed out on a number of occasions that in
the social, economic and political spheres, where the legislature
must reconcile competing interests in choosing one policy among
several that might be acceptable, the courts must accord great
deference to the legislature’s choice because it is in the best position
to make such a choice.70
Even more recently, we find the following statements in R. v. Mills:
“Thus courts must presume that Parliament intended to enact
constitutional legislation and strive, where possible, to give effect to this
intention,”71 and, in M. v. H.: “Courts are simply ill-suited to manage
holistic policy reform.”72
While the Supreme Court was reluctant to resort to the legislative
record to determine legislative intent in an early Charter case,73
statements in recent years74 suggest more openness to examining not
only the legislative record but also extrinsic materials of other kinds that
would give evidence of the mischief that the legislation sought to cure.
Some have suggested that there is a dialogue taking place between the
courts and Parliament that allows each to have input on particular policy
issues as they work towards the best solution.75 The Supreme Court
________________________________________________________________
69

For a discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Greene, The Charter of
Rights
(Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1989), at 62-69 and 222.
70
Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at
605-06. See also Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, supra,
note7163, at 194; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at 575-76.
R. v. Mills, [1999] 3. S.C.R. 668, at 711.
72
M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at 170-72, per Bastarache J.
73
Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
74
R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, at 483-84; RJRMacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at
242-43
and 333.
75
Hogg and Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)”
(1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; Ryder, “The Supreme Court’s Role:
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itself has expressly accepted this characterization in at least two recent
cases and goes on to suggest, in both those cases, that such a dialogue
enhances the democratic process.76 Others claim that this dialogue
theory has been overstated; that the dialogue goes in one direction only
and that the courts have effectively been issuing orders that Parliament
must obey.77 Christopher Manfredi asserts what he calls the “paradox”
whereby, in Canada, as in other countries, judicial supremacy is
overtaking constitutional supremacy and thereby diminishing our
capacity to govern ourselves through our conventional political
process.78 It is not clear, in any event, that Parliament and the other
legislatures are yet taking full advantage of the dialogue that the
Supreme Court believes exists.
Indications from the Supreme Court that it will sometimes defer to the
legislatures, that it is open to seeking extrinsic evidence of legislative
intent and that it is thinking in terms of a dialogue with the legislatures
would all suggest the wisdom of governments, through Parliament and
the other legislatures, making very transparent the policy considerations
that underlie the decisions and approaches taken in legislation, as well
as the evidence that support these decisions. Governments would be
wise to pay particular attention to contextual arguments based on
balancing other societal interests that they might make under section 1
of the Charter or under the rights section itself. It is likely that courts
will be much more receptive to arguments along those lines than to
arguments that are directed only at limiting the scope of entrenched
rights.
Although these theories have been developed in Charter cases, they
evidence a way of thinking on the part of the Court that could probably
apply, at least to some extent, in relation to cases involving Aboriginal
and treaty rights. Therefore, governments would also be wise to pay
particular attention to arguments based on justifications for limitations
on the rights under section 35 rather than relying primarily on
arguments relating to the scope or existence of the rights. In relation to
Too Much Power?” (2000 Constitutional Cases, Professional
Development Program, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 6
April76 2001), Tab 12.
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at 566 and R. v. Mills,
supra,
note
71, at 711.
77
See, for example, Morton and Knopff, The Charter Revolution
and 78
the Court Party (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000).
Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the
Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford
University Press, 2001).

Job Name: SCLR14

Time:23:04

1st proofs

Date:Friday, February 10, 2012

272

Supreme Court Law Review

(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)

section 35 rights, the courts have put an added emphasis on negotiation
so this would be an important factor in determining whether limitations
on these rights are justified.
Before leaving this section there is another aspect of the relationship
between the legislatures and the courts that should be mentioned.
Sometimes it appears that courts are filling in on policy decisions where
governments have failed to do so,79 or have failed to do so with enough
speed. We have already noted that, even before 1982, courts have from
time to time taken a leap in the law that has no precedential or
legislative basis. Now that we have entered a rights age when a
balancing of competing values has become the norm, occasions for the
courts to take such leaps have become more numerous.
In the area of Aboriginal and treaty rights, where nothing but the
barest affirmation was included in section 35, there was enormous scope
for the courts to take charge and move the agenda along. It is well
recognized that Aboriginal communities are often among the most
vulnerable in Canadian society, living sometimes in shocking
circumstances of poverty and despair. Since both the courts and the
legislatures have a role to play in seeing that the rights of the Aboriginal
peoples are fully accommodated, if Parliament and the legislatures
appear not to be moving as quickly as they should to advance the
situation of Aboriginal peoples, it is natural that the courts will do so
using their only tool at hand, namely a judicial pronouncement on
rights. Decisions like Sparrow80 and Marshall81 were turning-point
cases. New ways of interpreting Aboriginal rights were established that
pushed governments to pay more attention to these rights.
As with the Charter, it will be important for governments to find ways
to make transparent the various considerations that go into the policy
choices that it makes in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights so that
the courts can be assured that the governments are doing what they can
to accommodate rights and interests in a timely way.

________________________________________________________________
79

See, for example, Vriend v. Alberta, supra, note 76, at 575-76
where a statement by the Government of Alberta was interpreted by
Cory and Iacobucci, JJ. as a “deference” to the Court to decide whether
sexual orientation should be added as a ground in Alberta’s human
rights legislation. They say “The Government responded to this
recommendation
by deferring the decision to the judiciary.”
80
R.
v.
Sparrow,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
81
R. v. Marshall No. 1, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456.
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VI. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT
The Government of Canada, and other governments in Canada, have
multiple roles and responsibilities. The most fundamental duty of
government is to promote the general public interest and to do the best it
can for all Canadians. That includes the duty to make the best public
policy decisions that it can and to spend wisely, and carefully, its
taxpayers’ money. The government has the duty to uphold the rule of
law, democratic principles and other values fundamental to Canadian
society.
At the same time, the Government of Canada, and other governments
in Canada, have a duty to protect the interests that are identified in our
Constitution as warranting special protections. These include the
Charter rights and the Aboriginal and treaty rights already discussed.
They also include a number of group rights that have developed in
Canada’s own historical context. These are sometimes cast as individual
rights but have the interest of a minority group at the core. There are
protections afforded to Canada’s two official languages, French and
English, as well as schooling rights granted to minority populations of
those two linguistic groups. In several provinces, special religious
schooling rights continue to exist. Finally, there are all the statutory
obligations created by Parliament and the other legislatures, as well as
contractual obligations undertaken by governments that must be met.
Governments must take all these factors into account when they make
social or economic policy decisions, when they decide how to spend
money, when they decide whether to acceed to the requests or demands
of a particular individual or group of citizens and when they decide how
to respond to the threat of litigation.
The world of governing has become very complex and the emergence
of a rights culture is very much a part of this complexity. A positive
aspect of the recognition of the importance of rights is that governments
are paying much more attention to the impact of their decisions on
existing rights. At the same time, however, there is concern that this
attention to rights is carrying with it some costs.
VII. CONCERNS RELATING TO THE PROCESS OF GOVERNING
Politicians, policy-makers, government advisors and government
watchers in general have voiced a variety of concerns about possible
negative results flowing from the need to ensure that constitutionally
entrenched rights are respected. Some of these concerns are explored in
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this section. The extent to which they are grounded in experience cannot
be determined in the abstract. However, as a first step it is important to
attempt an articulation and understanding of the concerns that are
expressed so that they can either be dealt with or laid aside.
1. A General Increase in Litigation — Mega-cases
Against Governments
There is a perception, particularly in government circles, that the increased
emphasis on rights, resulting in part from the constitutionalization of certain
rights has led to increased litigation in general and increased expectations of
government responsibility in particular. Governments have been named as
defendants in huge lawsuits, sometimes resulting from events long past.
It is undoubtedly true that Canadians have become increasingly litigious
against each other as individuals, against private organizations and against
governments. This phenomenon is not unique to Canada and is one that has
drawn considerable attention. The entrenchment of rights in the
Constitution has likely enhanced the tendency to litigate, thereby
augmenting the volume of litigation even beyond the additional litigation
flowing from the newly recognized rights themselves.
For some years, a reaction to this situation has been developing.
People are trying to find ways to avoid resorting to the courts. The allor-nothing, winner-take-all approach to dispute resolution is questioned
by citizens in relation to disputes amongst themselves. Governments are
asking the same questions.
Some very large claims have been made against governments in
recent years. Many of these claims have nothing to do with Charter
rights or Aboriginal and treaty rights. However, because these claims
are arising at the same time as governments are coping with the large
volume of claims based on entrenched rights, there is a tendency to
confuse the two types of cases. It is very important to distinguish
between them. There is nothing new in principle about claims arising
from alleged wrongs inflicted by governments on groups or individuals.
Similar actions could have been instituted long before 1982 under our
general tort, contract or statutory law, depending on the circumstances
of the case.
One recent example of mega-litigation affecting the Government of
Canada that does not arise, at least primarily, from constitutionally
protected rights82 is the “hepatitis C” litigation, arising from difficulties
________________________________________________________________
82

That is not to say that the entrenched rights may not be raised in
relation to some aspect of these cases or, some time in the future, in
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with the blood system. Another is the many individual lawsuits relating
to the treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools. These
lawsuits are directed against other parties as well as governments. In the
case of the residential schools, governments were involved in
establishing, monitoring or regulating them while churches operated the
schools. The governments may be particularly vulnerable to such suits
since citizens tend to look first to governments for assistance both
because of their relationship to governments and because of the
financial resources available to governments.
One concern that is often expressed about some of the mega-litigation
that the government is facing, is that too much emphasis is being put on
sins of the past that cannot be changed, especially if recent governments
had no involvement in those sins. General observations are made that
litigation is not the best way to address past wrongs since it inhibits us as
a society from moving ahead. On the other side, views are put forward
that without some formal action, like litigation and compensation, deeplyfelt grievances will not be adequately addressed. There is a need for a
tangible acknowledgment of past wrongs by governments and society at
large that goes to the very core of the self-respect of the individuals or
groups who were aggrieved, or who represent those who were aggrieved.
These are important issues and they need to be explored, but it is
important to understand that these cases do not flow directly from the
entrenchment of Charter rights or of Aboriginal and treaty rights.
Depending on policy choices by governments involved in some of this
mega-litigation, there may be solutions available to governments to limit
their liability that would not likely be available in litigation arising from
the entrenched rights. For example, it might be possible to invoke
existing statutory limitation clauses in certain cases. Alternatively, it
might be possible to diminish or remove liability through new
legislation. These approaches, particularly the latter, might themselves be
susceptible to legal challenge, including Charter challenge, but they are
avenues that could be explored in ordinary litigation. Of course, such
approaches may be politically quite unpalatable. What is important is that,
in making decisions on what options to explore, governments clearly
understand whether they are making their decisions on legal grounds or
on policy or political grounds.

relation to the way these claims are ultimately resolved. But the point
here is that the source of these claims is the ordinary law, not the
entrenched rights.
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It is important to dispel perceptions that put more problems at the feet
of entrenched rights than rightfully belong there. The way is now open
to move on to those concerns that do relate to entrenched rights as such.
2. A Loss of Control
The issue of the power shift from governments and legislatures to the
courts was discussed at some length in the section on the role of the
courts. That is one way — how issues are resolved — in which control
can be seen to be lost by governments as a result of rights litigation.
There are others. Another concern frequently expressed is the loss of
control by the government of its own agenda. Rights cases frequently
receive a great deal of media attention necessitating, in turn, the direct
attention of politicians and government officials.
Perhaps the most disquieting aspect of rights claims for governments is
the randomness with which many of these claims seem to come up,
particularly those under the Charter. There are, of course, many situations
where cases can be foreseen (for example in rapidly developing areas such
as equality claims relating to sexual orientation) but the Charter allows for
many unexpected claims as well.
Another concern is that governments are losing control because of the
sheer volume of these rights cases. This is particularly true of the cases
relating to Aboriginal and treaty rights.
There is no magic solution to any of these concerns. Governments
cannot simply resign themselves to this loss of control, but must
continue to seek ways to manage the unpredictability and volume of
these cases. One approach would be to increase communication between
governments and rights holders so as to broaden their input into
government decisions at an earlier stage. This might succeed, in some
cases, in moving the focus of the relationship between governments and
rights holders towards negotiation and solutions rather than to the
adversarial approach of litigation.
3. A Dampening Effect on Policy Decisions
A frequently heard suggestion is that the very existence of the Charter
and section 35 is inhibiting good policy initiatives. If this is the case, the
social costs, while not susceptible to precise measurement, could be
significant. The claim is that there have been policy initiatives that should
have gone ahead, but have not gone ahead for fear of complex litigation to
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follow, or, alternatively, that the initiatives that have succeeded in going
ahead, have been so watered down as to significantly reduce their efficacy.
On one level this concern amounts to an inquiry into the ability of the
government to make effective policy decisions. This would include the
question of whether it is weighing its legal risks effectively. At the same
time, it may be that the most important result of the second thought
given to policy initiatives is an overall improvement in the quality of
those initiatives that do go forward.
In order to assess the dampening effect properly it would be necessary
to track the progress of actual policy initiatives to determine to what
extent the existence of entrenched rights do in fact inhibit policy
initiatives. It is certainly true that initiatives are subjected to
constitutional scrutiny in the normal course within government. To
balance this concern it would be necessary to track, as well, how many
policy initiatives that did not go ahead as originally proposed were
appropriately prevented from doing so. It would be important to
identify, in either case, the reasons why policy initiatives that did not go
ahead could not be adjusted to meet constitutional requirements;
whether, for example, the problem related to political concerns, costs,
administrative burden or something else.
An initiative might be withdrawn because it is underinclusive. A
rights assessment might lead to the conclusion that the program under
consideration had to be broadened beyond the class of citizens originally
contemplated in order to provide benefits to a broader range of
individuals. In the context of available funding, the benefits might then
be so thinly spread that the program would cease to be effective. It
would be informative to determine whether such a situation has ever
actually arisen. If it has, it would be instructive to consider why the
government wished to grant benefits to the narrower group and the
government’s rationale for drawing the line where it did. We have seen,
earlier in this paper, that the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, are
asking similar questions. Governments would be well advised to ensure
that they have good answers for these questions when they develop any
new benefits programs.
Another way an initiative could be withdrawn might be as a result of
an intense political lobby. It may happen that pressure groups couch
their objections in terms of rights even if rights are not the real issue. It
would be useful to determine if this type of situation has occurred often,
if at all.
To put into perspective the general concern that rights have a
dampening effect on policy initiatives, perhaps it is worth observing that
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many policy initiatives of governments may move ahead with minimal
interface with entrenched rights. One could mention, for example,
balancing the budget, international trade issues, health care issues, energy
issues, environmental issues and federal-provincial relations. All of these
will touch rights issues from time to time, but rights issues would likely
not predominate. Therefore, it would be instructive to gather data on the
proportion of policy initiatives that actually do engage rights issues to a
significant degree.
4. Concerns About Other Legitimate Interests
Fairly closely related to the concern about a dampening effect is the
concern that a focus on rights is interfering with the consideration of other
interests that do not have the status of rights. There are a number of
different facets to this concern.
From one point of view this may amount to a suggestion that some of
the rights that have constitutional protection do not merit inclusion.
There is not much to be done about this aspect of the concern short of a
constitutional amendment (involving political actors across the country)
or resort to the “notwithstanding clause” in section 33, if available.
Resort to section 33 would seem, in most instances, to be inappropriate
to cover a situation of such generality.
Conversely, this concern may amount to a suggestion that certain
other interests ought to be protected at the level of rights. Again, there is
no immediate action that can be taken to remedy that situation short of a
constitutional amendment to include the interest in question. It should
be noted, though, that the balancing that takes place under section 1 and
other sections of the Charter already provides a mechanism to have
these other interests taken into account.
Sometimes this concern takes the form of a complaint that rights have
coloured the way governments are seeing the world in such a way as to
lead them to less than optimal policies and actions. It may evidence a
deeper feeling that there is something wrong with a social structure that
requires that everything be seen through a “rights” lens. It may also
simply be a cry of frustration resulting from having to take rights
seriously. The last suggestion may be closest to the truth, because it is
difficult to find a basis on which to agree that the government is looking
through a distorted lens when it takes rights into account in its decisionmaking.
Taking a somewhat different approach, sometimes the question arises
as to whether there are any situations where a government action that
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does not fully accommodate protected rights could ever be justified as
being itself beneficial. In other words, can “good works” ever amount to
a legitimate trade-off against existing rights? As has already been
observed, governments do have access to balancing tests under section 1
and certain other sections of the Charter and can balance competing
interests in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights provided they can
meet the justificatory tests articulated by the courts.
It would be informative to inquire into what sorts of things would
qualify as “good works.” They would likely have to be directed at some
disadvantaged group. Perhaps alleviation of poverty in some direct way
would qualify in certain circumstances. It may be that some rights are
more susceptible than others to this type of an analysis. It is not easy to
imagine a situation where section 15 of the Charter (equality rights) might
be diminished by some other interest, since the essence of that right is to
treat all individuals as equally deserving of the government’s care and
concern.
Some ask whether deserving groups or individuals whose interests are
not protected will simply get lost in the shuffle. One response is that the
existence of rights for some is not likely to prevent assistance for others.
Charter rights, in particular, are set out as protections, not requirements.
Furthermore, subsection 15(2)83 of the Charter (affirmative action)
would seem to provide some legal basis, either through that subsection
itself or through its effect on subsection 15(1),84 to assist some of these
forgotten groups so long as the assistance within those groups is not
given in a discriminatory way.
In order to assess the concern about groups or individuals being
overlooked, it would be necessary, if the concern is just a general one, to
give serious thought to who it is that might be forgotten. If we cannot
find an answer to that question, the concern has no practical effect. If we
can, then we may have something to work on, either by broadening the
scope of our initiative or by addressing the new problem in whatever
________________________________________________________________
83

Subsection 15(2) reads as follows:
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
84
See Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at 1003-11,
where it is suggested that at our current stage of jurisprudence,
subsection 15(2) should likely be handled through subsection 15(1).
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way is appropriate. It would be necessary to have an appreciation of the
specific case to find the appropriate approach.
Suggestions have been made that the expenditure of resources to
accommodate rights or to compensate those whose rights have been
infringed will take away our financial capacity to deal with more
pressing social problems (or otherwise divert us from these problems).
One wonders first whether there are more pressing social problems than
those that relate to needs that have already been recognized to be
deserving of constitutional protection. One also wonders how real these
suggestions might be on a practical level in any event. Would one not
more likely expect to find a positive correlation between the
constitutional recognition of individual and minority rights in a
particular country and a progressive record of social policy advances in
that country? Most Canadians would agree to, and take pride in, the fact
that ours is a progressive record.
There are no absolute answers to the questions raised in this section,
but they are important, and it is important to ask them and to probe the
concerns that underlie them. Equally important is the recognition that
the rights entrenched in our Constitution are here to stay and
governments must respect them, even as they seek to ensure that other
interests are taken into account and that the public interest is met.
VIII. THE IMPACT OF RIGHTS ON SOCIETY
The previous section dealt with the impact of rights on the act of
governing. Broader concerns are raised outside government as to the
impact of rights on society itself. This section will look at some of them
and will conclude by referring to recent literature on the subject in fields
other than law. To put the concerns into perspective, however, some
general observations must first be made on the advantages to society of
the constitutional recognition of rights.
Most people would agree that it is a good thing for a society to have
an articulated set of values. Most would agree, as well, that it is
important to provide special protections for those members of society
who are, for one reason or another, in a weakened position. The
recognition and protection of rights serve a number of different
purposes. The most commonly recognized purposes are to protect
individuals from the unchecked power of the state and to protect
minorities from the domination or disregard of majorities.
There are more subtle advantages to the protection of rights. The
recognition of individual rights in the fundamental law of a country
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formalizes the democratic principle of the worth of each individual and
articulates certain core values of that country.
With respect to group rights, the mere fact that a minority group is
mentioned as deserving of protection can add to the sense of self-worth
of that group and encourage, among the members of the group, a sense
of belonging both within the group and within the broader society.
Beyond the obvious advantage of having the rights themselves, the very
recognition of the rights can provide motivation to a disadvantaged
group to improve the circumstances of their lives generally. The
recognition of their rights can also add to the sense of commitment on
the part of minorities to society at large. This can only be beneficial to
everyone.
Recognition of individual or group rights gives the rights-holders a
voice that they may not have had before. It legitimizes their concerns.
Without these rights there may be no way for them to get the attention
of governments that they require.
It has been mentioned already that Canadians are very proud of the
rights that are protected in our Constitution. The Charter, conceived as a
unifying force, has probably gone some way in achieving that goal. At
the same time, not all reactions to our rights are positive.
Concerns that are raised by citizens are usually not fundamental. They
relate more to the way our rights are being interpreted than to the
existence of the rights themselves. Some worry, for example, that the
wrong balance has been struck, in the protections afforded an accused
under the Charter, between those accused of crimes and victims of
crime.
At a broader level, it has been suggested that powerful groups in
society, such as corporations or wealthy litigants, are in a better position
to be able to assert their claims than those who are truly in need,
sometimes even to the detriment of the interests of the disadvantaged.
Related to this is the suggestion that the weaker groups in society must
turn their cases over to lawyers and the legal system, thereby losing a
direct relationship with their own issues as these issues are being
resolved. The point of these concerns is the suggestion that, without a
general restructuring of our society, the full effect of the entrenched
rights can never be achieved.
Sometimes fears are expressed that rights, by being written down, lie
open to being diminished by an attitude of strict adherence to the letter
of the law rather than being given a generous interpretation. Governments
might be tempted to see these rights as ceilings, not floors. In a similar vein,
one might argue that once rights are recognized and entrenched, they may
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be taken for granted in such a way as to close off creative thinking around
the issues that lie under the rights.
Sometimes the suggestion is made that, even within a rights-holding
group, whether that group is a minority within the scope of section 15 or
an Aboriginal group protected under section 35, there may be
disadvantaged sub-groups within those groups whose interests are
dismissed or ignored. In this scenario, the minority would become a
majority in relation to the sub-group. The fear is that such a situation
would be harder to expose and rectify than that of a primary minority.
None of these concerns should be ignored. They reflect an honest
desire to ensure that rights are fully respected in individual cases.
Concerns are also being expressed on a broader level. These relate to the
effect that the existence of rights may be having on the way that citizens
relate to their society as a whole.
Some say that too much attention is given to “rights talk” and not
enough to broader issues of concern to society at large. Joel Bakan, in
his book Just Words,85 captures this concern even in the title, with its
play on words. He suggests that to focus on rights is to miss the big
picture. One might miss the underlying problems or issues if one looks
only as far as the rights. Rights are just a very small piece of the puzzle
that is society. Bakan sums up his thoughts in the following way:
The struggle for social justice is much larger than constitutional
rights; it is waged through political parties and movements,
demonstrations, protests, boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience,
grassroots activism, and critical commentary and art.86
What this author underplays, it would appear, is the fact that the Charter
has moved our social agenda forward. It has had a significant impact on
protecting rights, particularly those of minorities and those included in
section 15. A similar comment can be made in relation to section 35,
Aboriginal and treaty rights.
In a related vein, there are those who would suggest that a focus on
rights, as well as diverting our attention, actually interferes with a true
attempt to solve societal problems. Allan Hutchinson argues, in his book
Waiting for Coraf,87 that to focus on rights is to divert us from the more
________________________________________________________________
85

Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs
(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1997).
86
Id., at 152.
87
Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).
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fundamental need to talk to each other, to engage in a “democratic
conversation.” He says:
Rather than settle for the attenuated discourse of rights-talk, people
must aspire to a truly democratic polity that will enable and oblige
them to become full and contributing citizens in an expansive civic
dialogue over the terms and conditions of social life and personal
living.88
Bakan suggests that Hutchinson does not pay enough attention to the
fact that social forces colour “democratic dialogue” just as the “rights
discourse” is constrained by the system within which it operates.
The need to see ourselves as interconnected with other citizens is a
theme that comes up frequently in relation to concerns about an undue
emphasis on rights. One often hears the comment that to focus on our
own rights is to lead us to neglect our responsibilities to others. Some of
the ways this general thought is expressed are discussed below.
In an unlikely article on postmodernism,89 reviewing a work by
Michael J. Trebilcock on economic theory, Allan Hutchinson expresses
these concerns in an interesting way. In propounding his own views on
rights and citizenship, he stresses the organic nature of society and
pleads that citizens should not see others as threats to their own freedom
and fulfilment. He points out that the fate of all of us is interconnected
and that a focus on rights creates barriers that separate people. He
proposes that instead of the “me/they” dichotomy that flows from a
focus on rights, we move to a “me/we” approach. Context, he says in
true postmodern form, is always important. There can be no absolute
rules.
Michael Ignatieff, in The Rights Revolution,90 speaks about our
general approach to, and relationship with, society. He explores the
importance of reconciling different claims and recognizing the validity
of opposing claims. He underlines the need to find a way to enhance our
solidarity as a country in the midst of all the competing claims. We need
to feel a connection to others from other groups in our society and to
feel that their wins are our wins.
________________________________________________________________
88
89

Id., at xii.
Hutchinson, “Michael and Me: A Postmodern Friendship”
(1995),
33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 237-58.
90
Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto: House of Anansi
Press, 2000).
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Alan Cairns, in Citizens Plus,91 picks up a similar theme in relation to
Aboriginal peoples. He argues that our dialogue has gone too far in
recognizing the separateness of Aboriginal groups and stresses the
importance of seeing Aboriginal peoples as Canadian citizens as well as
Aboriginal persons. It is important, he states, to address the issue of how
the overall Canadian community will co-exist with Aboriginal selfgovernment. It is important to understand what holds us together and
what obligations we have to each other.
Attempts have been made to develop theories that can accept the
legitimacy of constitutionally protected rights while at the same time
recognizing the need to take other competing interests into account. One
such attempt was made in a book called Rights and Responsibilities92 by
Leon Trakman and Sean Gatien. Their approach was to develop a theory
of “internal constraints,” which they characterized as “responsibilities,”
that limit and define the content of rights. These “internal constraints”
would apply in addition to any “external constraints” established by law
and would be determined in the first instance by the rights-holder. Very
important to their theory was their belief that the state is not able to
determine what is necessary to protect social interests.
Therefore, in the final analysis, it would appear that the content of the
“internal constraints” would have to be determined by the courts, but
without state intervention. How or why the courts would take
jurisdiction is not explored.
Another Canadian author who appears to be thinking along similar
lines is Mark Kingwell. In his book, The World We Want: Virtue, Vice
and the Good Citizen,93 he explored the concept of friendship from
Greek philosophy and focused on a new type of citizenship that carries
with it a duty to participate in political dialogue with other citizens on
the basis of mutual respect and compassion. He saw rights as valuable
tools but believed that litigation undermines communities. He proposed
an emotional citizenship, rather than an intellectual one, and believed
that engaging in a process with other citizens would lead us to a better
society.
What appears to underlie both the theory of Trakman and Gatien and the
philosophy of Mark Kingwell is, once again, a desire to move towards a
________________________________________________________________
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Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian
State92(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000).
Trakman and Gatien, Rights and Responsibilities (Toronto:
University
of Toronto Press, 1999).
93
Kingwell, The World We Want: Virtue, Vice and the Good
Citizen (Toronto: Viking, 2000).
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society where the individuals in it communicate with each other and
accommodate each other’s rights and interests. Whether these proposals
could actually be put in place is probably not of primary importance. These
authors simply suggest a way of approaching conflicts to avoid some of the
problems they see in a rights-oriented society.
The issue of how to respect individual and group rights, while at the
same time maintaining the commitment of all citizens to their larger
community and to their country, is central to much of the discussion on
the subject of rights. Although not articulated in quite the same way as
are the concerns expressed by politicians and government officials, they
form a backdrop against which those concerns can be understood in a
more profound way.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the impact of the entrenchment in our
Constitution of the Charter and of Aboriginal and treaty rights. It has
sought to understand these new rights within the context of our legal
system. Several of the cases that have had a significant impact on
governments have been examined.
The paper has examined the role of the courts and the role of
governments. It has exposed a number of concerns about entrenched
rights from a government perspective, and has tried to examine these
concerns in a balanced way. The extent to which the concerns are real or
perceived, serious or minor, cannot be determined entirely in the
abstract, but will require a critical examination of the way decisions are
actually taken in government. This paper has also tried to provide a
broader context for those concerns by examining briefly some of the
ideas that are being expressed more generally about the effect of rights
on our society. It is hoped that this type of inquiry will enhance our
understanding of the challenges that we face.
There is little doubt that the process of governing has become more
complex since the Constitution Act, 1982. However, most would argue
that the entrenchment of new rights has had a net beneficial effect on
our society. In any event, governments will continue to make policy
decisions on behalf of citizens, and individuals and groups will continue
to press for their rights. Courts will continue to adjudicate in this sphere.
The more we can understand about the dynamics of these relationships,
the better all sides will play their parts.
It will be important for those involved in making policy decisions,
who feel in any particular instance that they are being driven to a
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solution that is less than optimal, to communicate the specific details of
how they believe this to be the case. Only then can we determine
whether policy choices are actually being distorted when rights are
involved, and, if they are, what values are not being accommodated.
Without an honest assessment of what is really at stake we will never be
comfortable that the right choices are being made.
We should face these tasks with a level of optimism. We are well
placed, as Canadians, to delve into these issues. Fundamentally, we are
proud of the fact that rights are protected in our Constitution. Therefore,
we are unlikely to conclude that our concerns outweigh the value of
having these rights.
Canada is a leader in recognizing the need to accommodate group
rights as well as individual rights. Canadians are widely sought by other
countries as consultants on minority rights issues. One could mention,
for example, Will Kymlicka,94 Charles Taylor95 and Michael Ignatieff.96
We are used to these issues. We value the diversity in the multiple
cultural heritages of our citizens. We have taken care to ensure that both
official languages, French and English, are used and flourish and that
the minority communities that speak those languages have the support
they need. Our efforts have given us a wealth of experience in
protecting minority group interests. We are working with the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada to find solutions to some of the problems in their
communities as we struggle to understand fully the implications of the
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the
Constitution Act, 1982.
Finally, rights are with us to stay and it is incumbent on us to improve
our ways of dealing with them. A first step in that direction is to develop
a deeper understanding of our concerns and the next step is to examine
________________________________________________________________
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these concerns on a practical level so that we can discard the false
problems and deal with the real ones.
For now, if this paper succeeds in articulating some of the concerns
felt by those involved in making policy decisions in a rights culture, and
in shedding some light on them, it will have achieved its purpose.
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